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Abstract 
The purpose of this report is to explore the possibility of improving DoD cost 
estimation methods by including explanatory variables that capture the coordination 
and motivation problems associated with the program.  Accordingly, we note that 
cost overruns remain a well-documented and significant problem for DoD, and 
consider why that problem continues.  We review the current state (and limitations) 
of DoD cost estimation methodology and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE).  We 
then consider reasons why including TCE explanatory variables might (or might not) 
improve cost estimation.  To explore the potential contribution of TCE variables, we 
considered two cases of Army surface-to-surface missiles: Javelin and the Army 
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS); we also analyzed standard program cost data 
bases for indications of transaction costs.  While the case studies indicated that TCE 
variables have promise in improving the explanatory power of cost estimates, the 
standard data bases are poorly designed (at best) to shed light on program 
transaction costs.  Our policy conclusion is that the complete costs of major 
transactions together with key characteristics of the market, need to be captured and 
understood in order to properly anticipate the full costs of major defense acquisition 
programs. 
Keywords: Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), cost estimation, cost 
overruns, Javelin and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), defense 
acquisition programs 
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I. Introduction 
There is mounting evidence of a systematic bias in initial cost estimates of new 
weapon systems. A comprehensive 2006 RAND report on major weapons programs 
concludes: “[The] analysis indicates a systematic bias toward underestimating the costs 
[…] of a weapon system.” (Arena 2006, p.1). This bias could threaten our national 
security. Unrealistically low cost estimates result in cost overruns. Fixing cost overruns 
can impact military readiness. 
Two factors are usually blamed for unrealistically low cost forecasts: bad 
incentives (psychological and political-economic explanations) and bad estimates 
(methodological explanations). The focus of this study is on cost methodology. Our goal 
is to contribute some new ideas to the current literature on cost estimating. This paper 
applies Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (e.g., Williamson, 1985; Dillard, Franck & 
Melese, 2006) to help characterize, explain, and ultimately reduce the cost growth that 
plagues many of today’s major investments in military capabilities.  
In business, two costs are typically factored into the “make-or-buy” decision: 
production costs and the costs of managing transactions—“transaction costs” (Coase 
1937). Conventional estimation techniques tend to focus on production costs (input 
costs, learning curves, economies of scale and scope, etc.). TCE emphasizes another 
set of costs—primarily the costs of coordination and motivation (e.g., search and 
information costs, decision and contracting costs, monitoring and enforcement costs). 
The primary insight drawn from TCE is that correctly estimating the economic 
production costs of an acquisition is necessary, but not sufficient. The choice of 
contract, organization, and incentives, along with key characteristics of markets and 
transactions (uncertainty, complexity, asset specificity, frequency, and contestability), 
must be included to obtain reliable cost estimates.  
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II. Background 
A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) study cites multiple examples 
of weapon systems cost increases. The GAO reports significant unit procurement cost 
increases for several familiar programs. The Joint Strike Fighter saw unit procurement 
costs increase over 25%, the Army’s Future Combat Systems over 50%, while the Air 
Force’s F-22A Raptor experienced almost 200% procurement cost overruns (GAO April 
2006, p.5).  According to another GAO report, “[p]rograms consistently move forward 
with unrealistic cost […] estimates” (GAO Mar 2006, p.1). 
Traditional cost estimating relies on a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS). Similar 
to an economist’s production function, a WBS captures the mix of inputs and activities 
required to produce a specific weapon system. Cost estimates developed for each 
component of the WBS are rolled up into an overall estimate for the project. Also, 
simulation methods can be used to capture uncertainty and provide a distribution of 
possible weapon system costs. Confidence intervals applied to this distribution allow 
cost estimators to report probabilities associated with specific ranges of costs for a 
particular weapon system. However, the confidence in these cost estimates depends 
inter alia on the completeness of the model. TCE offers complementary considerations 
that can impact the costs of major weapon systems, many of which are known but not 
explicitly factored into traditional cost estimates. 
In its recent review of the literature, a RAND study reports, “our analysis […] 
shows that, by and large, the DoD and military departments have underestimated the 
cost of buying new weapon systems” (Arena, 2006).  Virtually all the studies that RAND 
examined found a systematic downward bias in cost estimates. The average cost 
growth over initial forecasts of weapon systems in the development phase ranged from 
16 to 26%. Estimates of procurement cost growth averaged between 16% and 65%, 
while total weapon program cost overruns averaged between 20 to 54%.  
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Cost estimates serve two main functions. First, they serve as an integral part of 
the decision process (cost-benefit or “analysis of alternatives”) used to evaluate military 
investments. Second, they provide the foundation for future defense budgets.   
In the first case, underestimating costs can result in overestimates of the 
affordable quantity of those weapons. It can, therefore, result in too many new weapon 
program starts and excessive investments in those systems. In the second and related 
case, unrealistically low cost estimates result in overly optimistic budgets. Budgets 
planned on the basis of optimistic cost estimates create the illusion of more resources 
available than actually exist. Since acquisition budgets are, in essence, a contract for 
major weapon systems between the DoD and Congress, unrealistic cost estimates can 
lead to a breach of trust and can poison relations between the branches of government. 
One method used to cope with cost overruns is to stretch out programs and cut 
quantities that reach the force. But this sacrifices both current and future operational 
capability. Moreover, spreading fixed costs over fewer units increases unit production 
costs. The end result can be to get less (quantity) for more (money). Another method to 
pay for cost overruns is finding savings in training, operations, and maintenance 
budgets. But this also risks sacrificing current and future operational capability. 
Reprogramming money from other programs to accommodate cost increases is another 
approach. But this is a limited remedy (constrained to no more than $10M in RDT&E 
and $20M in Procurement within a program element) and can have a negative and 
cascading effect on other programs’ costs, schedules, and performance. The net effect 
of cost overruns is clear. Short of a bailout from Congress, systematically 
underestimating costs reduces the overall readiness and availability of military forces 
and equipment. 
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III. Alternative Explanations of Unrealistic Cost 
Estimates 
The two factors commonly used to explain “unrealistic cost estimates” are bad 
incentives [due to optimism bias (psychological explanation), or perverse bureaucratic 
incentives and strategic misrepresentation of budgets (political-economic explanation)], 
and bad estimates [imperfect forecasting techniques such as an omitted variable bias 
(methodological explanation)]. It is helpful to examine these factors in the context of the 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process used by the DoD to 
build the nation’s defense budget.  
In theory, “Programming” involves a constrained optimization in which investment 
and operating decisions are made to maximize national security subject to fiscal 
constraints. The Secretary of Defense (including OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation 
(PA&E) and the DoD Comptroller) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have 
good reasons to prefer accurate cost estimates given their global optimization 
perspective. 
In contrast, given their sub-optimizing perspectives, Combatant Commanders 
and the Military Services (for instance) may be more subject to a bias toward optimism 
and to perverse bureaucratic incentives. Since their primary focus is on performance 
and military capability, they have reason to be less critical (and realistic) in their cost 
estimates.  
According to McNicol (2005, p. S-4), “statistical analysis is consistent with the 
well-established presumption that the military services tend to prefer […] optimistic 
procurement cost estimates.” Program Element Monitors (PEMs), for example, act as 
advocates for the funding of their programs and are responsible for defending those 
programs throughout the PPBE cycle. Since all programs compete for the DoD’s limited 
resources in a particular funding categories, PEMs are well aware that resource 
allocation is a competitive, constant-sum game. Given their job descriptions, PEMs are 
drawn to lower cost estimates that fit their advocacy agendas, rather than to higher cost 
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estimates which make defending their programs more difficult. Moreover, since they do 
not always posses a higher-level perspective, they may not fully appreciate how 
underestimating costs can impact other programs.  
Also, defense companies have good reasons to strategically underestimate costs 
since this makes their programs more attractive to the DoD and the Congress. Here, the 
logic can be interpreted by leveraging one of the hallmarks of TCE, the “fundamental 
transformation” (Williamson, 1996).  The standard example is when ex ante competitive 
bidding leads to an ex post bilateral monopoly situation. The risk is that the winning 
supplier can lock in the Government by making investments in productive assets that 
are specific to the relationship (and that have little value outside the relationship). Once 
the DoD “buys in,” defense firms can lock in their customer by investing in specific 
assets (e.g., production facilities) that act as barriers to entry. While initially 
advantageous, such investments in specific assets can make it prohibitively costly for 
other companies to compete in subsequent re-bidding of the contract.  
Given the complexity and uncertainty of many major, technologically advanced 
weapon systems, contracts are necessarily incomplete; i.e., they cannot cover all 
possible contingencies. As a consequence, the incumbent company can be confident it 
will recoup overruns from multiple change-orders (generally for added scope) 
anticipated over the life of the contract. In fact, firms have an incentive to anticipate, but 
strategically omit, some of these elements in the original contract negotiation. Moreover, 
by strategically hiring workers in key Congressional districts, the company can pressure 
Congress to retain the contract and approve compensation for cost overruns to 
preserve jobs. This combination of strategic behaviors could explain some of the 
systematic bias in initial cost estimates.  
Therefore, cost-estimating techniques must properly anticipate transaction costs 
such as measurement, monitoring, management and re-negotiation costs that can 
quickly overwhelm initial production cost estimates, and which vary according to the 
nature of the transaction. If TCE considerations are not properly anticipated, the result 
will be that cost-estimators will continue their downward bias, and programs will 
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continue to suffer cost overruns. One possible means to improve DoD cost estimation is 
to add transaction cost considerations to the current production cost focus in cost-
estimating methods.  
In an early attempt to address the factors that lead to biased cost estimates, 
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird directed that independent parametric cost estimating 
be made a part of the DoD acquisition process. The Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) launched an independent Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) that began 
operations in the Spring of 1972. Eventually, the CAIG was assigned the statutory 
responsibility of providing independent lifecycle cost estimates for all major weapon 
acquisition programs. According to McNicol (2005), “the introduction of independent 
parametric costing […] had a major, continuing effect on reducing procurement cost 
growth” (p.44).  
Whereas independent cost estimation is an important step that clearly attenuates 
the impact of psychological and political-economic factors, the challenge of developing 
a more comprehensive cost estimating/forecasting methodology remains. Hence, the 
primary focus of this study is to leverage insights from TCE to improve the DoD’s cost 
estimating/forecasting methodology—while recognizing those other causes of bias in 
cost estimates. 
The next section (IV) reviews traditional cost estimating.  The following section 
(V) reviews some key contributions of Transaction Cost Economics.  Section VI 
introduces two sets of hypotheses relating to DoD cost estimating and describes how 
insights from TCE might be leveraged to improve DoD cost estimation.  The following 
section (VII) of the paper offers two case studies interpreted in the context of TCE.  
Section VIII reports our search for evidence of transaction costs found within program 
office budgets and its results.  The concluding section (IX) offers some policy 
recommendations to improve future DoD cost estimating/forecasting. 
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IV. A Brief Review of Cost Estimating in the 
Department of Defense  
In the defense acquisition process, a cost estimate is a prediction or forecast of 
the cost of a program or weapon system.  DoD Instruction 5000.2 requires that both a 
program office estimate and a DoD component cost-analysis estimate be prepared in 
support of acquisition milestone reviews.  For major defense acquisition programs, 
these estimates are subject to review by the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
(CAIG).  In addition, the CAIG performs an independent lifecycle cost estimate for all 
ACAT ID programs and for certain ACAT IC programs.1  
The first step in any cost estimate is to understand the attributes of the program 
or weapon system whose cost is to be estimated. Traditionally, this requires 
understanding and describing the weapon system in terms of physical and technical 
parameters, operational and support concepts, mission requirements, and interfaces 
with other systems.  Understanding the program’s schedule and acquisition profile is 
also important in developing a cost estimate. The goal is to understand the relationship 
between key weapon system attributes and cost.  For programs reviewed by the CAIG, 
this first step is documented in the Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD), 
according to the guidelines in DoD 5000.4-M. 
The second step is to develop an explicit framework for the cost estimate.  The 
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) is a hierarchy of weapon system components 
(hardware, software, data, facilities, and services) that attempts to capture economic 
production cost elements of the estimate.  A WBS is developed by subdividing a 
product, process or service into its major work elements and sub-elements.  The highest 
                                            
1 Acquisition Category (ACAT) I is defined by DODI 5000.2 as a major defense acquisition program 
(MDAP) that either has a dollar value estimated by the USD(AT&L) to require an eventual total 
expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $365 million in fiscal 
year (FY) 2000 constant dollars or, for procurement, of more than $2.190 billion in FY 2000 constant 
dollars, or has been designated of special interest by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).  (DODI 
5000.2, enclosure 2) 
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level, the system WBS, can be organized according to the lifecycle phases of a system:  
Research & Development, Investment, Operating and Support and Disposal.   
Under each phase, a hierarchical structure documents the activities and 
resources required to complete the work associated with that phase. Under the 
Investment phase, for example, the Program WBS encompasses the entire acquisition 
program, including production costs derived from the Contract WBS.  This defines at an 
aggregated level what is to be procured and consists of at least three program levels 
with associated definitions.  
The Program WBS is used by the Government program manager and contractor 
to develop and extend a Contract WBS.  It contains uniform terminology, definitions, 
and placement in the input-oriented family tree structure.  The contract WBS provides 
the structure for information contained in the Contractor Cost Data Reporting System 
and other cost performance reports and is defined by Military Handbook 881A.  
Operating and Support costs are organized in a Cost Element Structure in accordance 
with CAIG guidance, similar to the way the WBS is used to organize development or 
production costs.  An example of a program WBS is shown in Figure 1. 
The level of detail in the WBS evolves as the system is defined and developed 
throughout its lifecycle.   After the program WBS has been approved, the contractor will 
then extend the contract WBS to the appropriate lower levels to better define the 
complete scope of the contract. When integrated with the program WBS, the extended 
contract provides a complete WBS for the acquisition program. Similar to the 
economists’ production function, the WBS reveals all the key inputs required to 
generate the ultimate output/product. 
 - 11 - 
 
Figure 1. Program WBS  
(DoD, 2005) 
The next step is to develop a cost estimate.  From the WBS perspective, the total 
cost of the system is obtained by adding up the cost of the individual elements (inputs) 
in the hierarchy across the levels of the WBS.  In order to do this, a cost estimate must 
be generated for each element of the WBS.  The level of detail of the cost estimate 
depends on the amount of information available about the system.  In the early stages 
of development, there are only rough estimates of the system parameters/attributes; 
therefore, only the highest levels of the WBS cost can be estimated using “rough order 
of magnitude” or “top-down” techniques such as analogy and parametric or cost 
estimating relationships (Blanchard, p. 595).  For example, the estimated cost of a new 
aircraft may be modeled as a function of the weapon system’s key inputs/attributes like 
empty weight, speed, useful load, wing area, power, and landing speed.  This model 
estimates the total cost of the aircraft based on a set of parameters independent of the 
WBS structure. 
As more information about the system becomes available, more detailed 
estimates can be developed for lower levels of the WBS using a variety of techniques.  
A cost estimate is now developed for each element at a given level of the WBS.  For 
example, the cost of the aircraft wing may be estimated using historical data for weight, 
area, and materials.  While this estimate is still based on the parametric technique, the 
 - 12 - 
level of detail (a wing) corresponds to a WBS element.  As the system matures, the 
work and resource requirements are sufficiently well defined to use ”bottoms up” 
techniques such as engineering estimates and actual costs obtained from prototypes 
and early production models.  An engineering (production function) estimate would be 
based on the labor, material and overhead required to complete a particular element of 
the WBS.  Obviously, this sort of estimation requires a great deal of information about 
how the system is built—data that is usually not available until the early phases of 
production.  Figure 2 shows the relationship between estimating techniques and the 

















Figure 2. Cost Estimating Techniques as a Function of Acquisition Phases 
While the WBS framework provides an excellent accounting system for cost 
estimates, it does have a few drawbacks.  First, although it does capture the functional 
relationship between inputs/elements, it does not explicitly show the correlation between 
cost elements. If there is a correlation between cost elements that are assumed 
independent, this can significantly increase the variability of the cost estimate.  Second, 
the program WBS, as defined by Military Handbook 881A , is input-oriented, not 
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relationship-oriented; it, therefore, largely overlooks transaction costs such as search 
and information costs, decision and contracting costs, monitoring and enforcement 
costs.  While it might be argued these costs are implicitly considered in the cost 
estimates of the various WBS components, it is likely that most are either 
underestimated or ignored, resulting in overly optimistic cost estimates.  
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V. A Brief Review of Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) 
Transaction costs are typically faced by organizations dealing with outside 
suppliers. These include costs associated with: source selection, periodic competition 
and renegotiation, contract management, market structure, and measuring and 
monitoring performance. TCE emphasizes four key characteristics of transactions: 
complexity, uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity.  Transaction Cost Economics 
offers an attractive theoretical foundation for competitive sourcing decisions in the 
private sector  (e.g., Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1971; 1979; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).  
However, TCE has been less often applied in a government setting  (e.g., Pint & 
Baldwin, 1997; Williamson, 1999; Franck & Melese, 2005; Dillard, Franck & Melese, 
2006). An underlying objective of TCE (as a field of inquiry) is to improve the design of 
contracts, organizations, and other governance structures that reduce transaction costs 
and improve the gains from exchange between buyers and sellers.  
TCE predicts parties involved in a defense transaction can benefit from 
cooperation in the buyer-seller relationship and, thereby, generate a surplus that can be 
shared. For example, specific investments2 made by either party that are of real value in 
the relationship (but perhaps of lesser value outside the relationship), can improve 
efficiency and effectiveness—yielding a surplus to be shared between the two parties. 
However, those parties often have conflicting interests; the DoD wants to maximize 
defense capabilities subject to budget constraints while Industry must concern itself with 
profits. Therefore, both sides have incentives to behave opportunistically, and may not 
necessarily have sufficient motivation to make investments that increase the parties’ 
total gains.  This is particularly true when specific assets are involved and information is 
imperfect and asymmetric. While defense acquisition focuses on production costs, it 
                                            
2 Asset specificity comes in a variety of forms, such as human, location and physical.  These are 
specialized assets that generate high returns within a specific relationship, but offer little value outside it. 
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also exposes the organization to costs of managing the outsourcing relationship and to 
the risks of bad (opportunistic) behavior on the part of contracting partners.  
Relationship-specific investments are potentially valuable, but can increase risks 
to both parties in a transaction. Having made a specialized investment, the supplier 
becomes the most efficient provider, and thus has an incentive to look for opportunities 
to extract more of the surplus (perhaps by demanding large increases in contract price 
to execute change orders). If a customer is “locked in,” they may have little recourse. At 
some point, the relationship is transformed from a customer having the choice of a 
number of competing suppliers to a bi-lateral monopoly relationship between a single 
buyer and single seller. At this point, close-in bilateral bargaining replaces the 
impersonal (arms’-length) arrangements of the competitive marketplace.   
This entails a basic transformation of the supplier from competitive bidder (prior 
to source selection) to monopoly supplier (after source selection), especially if there are 
no close substitutes for this particular contractor’s products.  Accordingly, the customer 
is now vulnerable to “opportunistic behavior”3 from the contractor. Unforeseen 
circumstances combined with newly inelastic demand may prompt the supplier to 
extract more of the surplus created in the relationship.4 The supplier can exploit its 
power in the relationship to renegotiate the basic agreement to its advantage, otherwise 
threatening to dissolve the agreement.  The TCE literature refers to this as a “hold up.”5  
This is one of the key insights TCE can offer to improve initial cost estimating. 
If the supplier makes specific investments in assets that are only valuable in the 
context of the relationship with a specific customer, it is vulnerable to any changes in 
                                            
3 Williamson, 1996, defines “opportunism” as “self-interest seeking with guile” 
4 Besanko, Williamson and others have labeled the transition from one prospective buyer and many 
sellers to one buyer and one seller, from competitive market to a one-on-one relationship, as the 
“fundamental transformation.”  This transformation occurs, at least to a certain extent, after the completion 
of every source-selection process. 
5 According to Besanko, “a hold up problem arises when a party in a contractual arrangement exploits the 
other party’s vulnerability due to relationship-specific assets.” 
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demand from that customer. Whereas relation-specific investments can increase the 
total gains from the defense acquisition, they also increase risks of opportunistic 
behavior, through which either party can hold up the other. For example, either party 
can hold up the other by threatening to change the terms of the contract (relationship). 
The danger is that if neither party feels like it can recover the full costs of its investment 
in the relationship/transaction (say through a continuation or renewal of the contract), 
then efficiency-generating specific investments will not be made, resulting in higher 
(unanticipated) costs.6  
A crucial insight of TCE is that different ex ante contracts offer different 
incentives for unproductive ex post bargaining and influence activities. As in game 
theory, it helps to look forward and reason back. If it appears managing the contract 
(including future competitions and/or renegotiations), and evaluating and monitoring 
performance, are likely to be costly (in terms of dollars or disputes, see Pigeon, 2006), 
then this should be taken into account in the original cost estimate, as well as in 
negotiating the optimal contract type. Table 1 provides a simple illustration of the 
spectrum of contract types that were awarded to the top 10 defense contractors over a 
six-year period.
                                            
6 Scope for opportunistic behavior may lead to adverse selection, choice of an (ex ante) inferior option (or 
technology), or moral hazard.  Such scope increases risk that if a relationship-specific investment is 
made, the other party will exploit the terms of the contract to “hold them up.” For example, changes in 
specifications are frequently used by contractors as a reason to raise prices and profits under government 
contracts, especially when those investments by the contractor create barriers to the entry of competitors. 
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Category Cost-Plus (C+) Fixed-Price (FP) Time & Materials 
1. Lockheed Martin 50% 47% 2% 
2. Boeing Co. 27% 70% 2% 
3. Raytheon Co. 38% 58% 3% 
4. Northrop Grumman 42% 50% 2% 
5. General Dynamics 39% 60% 0% 
6. SAIC 52% 21% 15% 
7. Carlyle Group 44% 46% 9% 
8. Newport News Ship 78% 22% 0% 
9. TRW 71% 23% 2% 
10. Computer 
Sciences 
41% 26% 24% 
Table 1. Unclassified Details on the Type of Contracts Won by the Top 10 
Contractors on Items Outsourced from 1998 to 2003  (Percent of Contracts Awarded 
that Were Cost-plus, Fixed-price and Time & Materials) (Makison, 2004) 
The more complex and uncertain the transaction, the less complete the 
statement of work (performance work statement (PWS)), then the greater the cost in 
using FP, and the more attractive other contracting options become.7 If the statement of 
work (PWS) describing the desired product, service or project can be specified precisely 
(IFB), and there are no transaction-specific assets involved, then FP type contracts 
have the benefit of creating cost-reducing incentives that reward the buyer through ex 
ante competition between potential suppliers. In this case, FP contracting increases 
contractor incentives to invest in cost reduction, and ex ante competition can transfer 
these cost-savings directly to the buyer.  
                                            
7 An example of the latter is Performance-based Logistics (PBL). The DoD defines PBL as: “an integrated 
acquisition and sustainment strategy for enhancing weapon system capability and readiness, where the 
contractual mechanisms […] include long-term relationships and appropriately structured incentives with 
service providers, both organic and non-organic [to] support the end user’s (warfighter’s) objectives.”  Any 
future investments in PBL could benefit from the multiple insights generated by TCE. The decision to 
outsource weapon system support or to bundle that support with an acquisition and to outsource the 
resulting bundle should weigh production cost savings against the costs and risks associated with a 
critical source of supply being outside the DoD’s control. Those costs and risks are part of the transaction 
costs of outsourcing. TCE indicates outsourcing should only occur if there are positive net savings from 
the external supply relationship. 
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In contrast, if the statement of work (PWS) cannot be specified precisely (RFP) 
or if there are significant specific assets involved in the transaction, then some surplus 
will be eroded by the frictions of ex post re-negotiation. This loss from unproductive 
bargaining activity is part of the cost of using a FP contract in this case. Initial cost 
estimates must take this into account. 
Evidence uncovered by Bajari and Tadelis (1999) reveals that in cases in which a 
transaction is easy to define and measure (i.e., there is little complexity), and only a few 
minor changes are expected (i.e., there is little uncertainty), FP-type contracts tend to 
dominate. However, the more complex the transaction—the more difficult/costly it is to 
define and measure performance, and the more uncertain—the more likely it is a 
change in the contract will be required, the more severe the adversarial relationships 
experienced ex post when FP contracts are chosen. In the latter case, FP-type 
construction contracts often ended in costly renegotiations in which any surplus 
generated was dissipated in the course of those negotiations through unproductive 
bargaining and influence activities. Thus, complexity and uncertainty can force parties to 
turn away from FP type contracts and towards C+ type contracts, and to rely heavily on 
reputation and other enforcement mechanisms to avoid ex post opportunistic behavior 
that threatens to dissipate the surplus generated by a transaction.  
FP (C+)-type contracts are usually prescribed in later (earlier) stages of product 
development when complexity and uncertainty have (have not) been resolved, and the 
performance work statement is well (not well) defined. Note that while these prescribed 
contracts focus on the characteristics of complexity and uncertainty, apparently 
overlooked are the vital roles of frequency and asset specificity—two key components 
of TCE.  
In the case of frequency, recurrent transactions often justify the setup costs of 
specialized assets and special governance requirements. They also offer the 
opportunity to apply learning curves (cumulative cost-quantity relationships) to lower 
production costs, and for gradual reductions in uncertainty as both parties learn more 
about costs. Recurring transactions also offer the possibility for the accumulation of 
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goodwill and to build reputations. Strategic partnerships and relation-specific 
investments can increase the benefits to both parties, but they also leave them 
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior, or a hold up, by the other party.  These 
vulnerabilities can be overcome with well-crafted contracts.  However, contracting (a) 
involves an expenditure of resources, and (b) cannot eliminate all risks associated with 
opportunistic behavior from partners in the transaction.8 
The interaction of opportunism with imperfect and asymmetric information raises 
the possibility of unproductive bargaining/influence or rent-seeking activities.9 The 
ultimate outcome—a balance of productive efforts and unproductive bargaining—
depends on the characteristics of the transaction, and the incentive structures that 
govern the parties involved, both of which should be factored into initial cost estimates.10  
Where a transaction requires little in the way of specific assets (no hold up 
problem), and involves a product or service that is a) well-defined and homogeneous 
(IFB), b) easy to measure (limited complexity and mild information asymmetry), c) 
routinely used (recurring/frequent purchases), d) not subject to change (limited demand 
uncertainty), and e) is offered by competing suppliers, then there is little room for 
negotiation (price and performance are market-driven), and the marginal benefit of 
unproductive bargaining is near zero. With little room for bargaining over such routine 
                                            
8 Costs associated with contracting and the holdup risks remaining are major components of “transactions 
costs.” The process of contracting includes drafting the relevant documents, negotiating a version of the 
contract that is signed, taking actions to enforce that contract, and renegotiating when needed. These 
tasks entail, at minimum, the services of skilled people who develop local knowledge of the specific 
business relationship. There may also be costs associated with litigation, to include both direct (e.g., 
monetary) and indirect (e.g., time delay) components. Furthermore, the basic contract may well need 
considerable administrative and management attention throughout its life, even if full-scale renegotiation 
is not undertaken. Accomplishing these tasks satisfactorily involves expenditure of resources and 
management attention.  Transaction costs (source selection, contract management and performance 
monitoring) can negate a significant portion of the production cost savings involved with outsourcing. 
9 The concept of unproductive bargaining and rent-seeking is usually attributed to Tullock (1971; 1993), 
Krueger (1974), and Bhagwati (1980).  A key insight of this literature is that costly bilateral bargaining by 
two parties for a bigger share of the surplus they jointly create can dissipate or even eliminate that surplus 
(Tullock, 1971).  
10 There are other factors as well. For example, Wolff and Reed (2000) find significant evidence that, inter 
alia, the nature of, and access to, assets in a joint venture are important in predicting the balance of 
positive sum (productive) and zero sum (unproductive) outcomes for the participants. 
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and uncomplicated transactions, substantial production and transaction cost stability 
can be expected in the defense acquisition. Moreover, since administrative, incentive, 
and enforcement costs tend to be low for acquisitions in more contestable (competitive) 
markets, the marginal cost of engaging in the transaction is smaller for the DoD, and 
there exists an incentive for the supplier to invest in the transaction which generates 
opportunities for cost savings.  
In general, the less complex and uncertain a transaction, the easier it is to write 
an explicit contract that covers all relevant contingencies. Moreover, the lower the 
administrative and enforcement costs of that contract, the lower the transaction costs 
associated with the contract. These favorable characteristics should encourage greater 
productive effort in the transaction relationship that, in turn, should contribute to lower 
costs and better products that benefit both parties. Identifying and understanding the 
characteristics of the transaction could result in more accurate initial cost estimates. 
Alternatively, transactions that involve a non-standard (less homogeneous or 
highly differentiated) product often take place in a bilateral monopoly contractual setting. 
In this case, assuming no specific assets are required, the results depend on the degree 
of contractual ambiguity governing the transaction, as well as on any administrative and 
enforcement costs involved. However, as complexity, uncertainty, and opportunism due 
to specific investments increase, so does the marginal benefit of bargaining or ex post 
renegotiation. This results in both higher transaction costs to measure, monitor, and 
govern the relationship, as well as an increased risk of holdup.  
Productive investment (or effort) involves two types of assets: general and 
specific. The greater the ratio of specific assets to total investments required in the 
relationship, the greater the risk of “holdup.” Moreover, as the threat of bilateral 
dependency increases, the more incomplete the contract (and the lower the penalty for 
reneging or renegotiation), the lower the marginal cost to each party of engaging in 
unproductive bargaining or renegotiation.  
In the face of incomplete contracting, the holdup problem poses a hazard called 
“maladaptation.” The risk of maladaptation is captured here as an increase in the return 
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to unproductive bargaining (for example, charging high prices for any change orders) or 
strategic renegotiation, both of which will increase costs from initial estimates.  Any time 
ex ante competition among suppliers is transformed into an ex post, bilaterally 
dependent relationship, additional governance structures may be required to induce 
cooperative adaptation.11 The challenge is to write a contract with enough precision to 
encourage desired performance, but enough flexibility to allow productive adaptation 
(adjustments), as circumstances require. But in the case of complex transactions and 
uncertain outcomes, “bounded rationality” precludes comprehensive ex ante contracting 
(contracts are inherently incomplete) which raises the possibility of gains from 
(unproductive) ex post opportunistic renegotiation (e.g., the “holdup” problem). Ideally, 
contracts can be written that specify measures of performance, conflict resolution 
procedures, and conditions under which the contract can be modified, as well as 
provisions for sharing gains from transaction-specific investments.12  
In reality, contracting offers an imperfect solution to opportunism. Additional 
governance mechanisms to settle disputes and adapt to new conditions, ex ante efforts 
to screen for reliability, and provisions to protect transaction-specific investments may 
well ameliorate these problems. However, governance isn’t costless, and such 
agreements often increase external transaction costs; and factoring those 
considerations into initial cost estimates may well improve their accuracy. 
Ashley & Workman (1986) caution that providing cost incentives in a contract can 
lead to disagreements and spoiled relationships and ex post friction in interpreting the 
outcomes. In fact, avoiding these frictions and reducing the advantages to renegotiation 
                                            
11 According to Williamson & Masten (1999), the “central problem of economic organization is adaptation” 
(p.xi). The challenge of adaptation is especially acute when ex ante competition leads to ex-post 
monopoly power. Whenever products, services or projects cannot be well specified in advance (due to 
complexity, uncertainty about future conditions, measurement difficulties, etc.), and they involve 
transaction-specific assets, then ex ante competition (e.g. competitive bidding) can lead to ex-post 
monopoly/monopsony power. In turn, this leads to costly adaptation through bilateral bargaining and 
renegotiation.  
12 The implications of this paper suggest that in the case of out-sourcing a transaction in which 
complexity, uncertainty and asset specificity can lead to renegotiation, the choice of governance structure 
will drive productive effort and unproductive bargaining.  
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can be accomplished by investing in a more complete PWS, and by adopting alternative 
mechanisms (e.g., reputation effects, GOCO13) to reduce the return from opportunistic 
behavior. TCE suggests that the degree of completeness of the PWS and the contract 
is an optimizing decision by both parties that reflects their trade-offs between an ex ante 
investment in the PWS and contract design, and the potential ex post cost of 
opportunistic renegotiation.  
A principal insight of TCE is that the choice of optimal governance structure 
depends on the characteristics of the transaction. Understanding these characteristics 
can improve initial cost estimates by: a) sorting transactions into categories based on 
their principal characteristics (uncertainty, complexity, asset specificity, contestability 
and frequency), and b) recognizing the costs and consequences of alternative 











                                            
13 GOCO means “Government Owned, Contractor Operated” production assets. 










THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 - 25 - 
VI. Hypotheses: Possible Contributions of TCE  
Our basic hypothesis is that including TCE considerations (currently an omitted 
variable) can improve cost-estimation methodology by (a) helping to explain the 
systematic bias observed in initial cost estimates, and (b) increasing the general 
explanatory power of cost estimations. That is, we assert the traditional WBS approach 
may overlook some important variables, resulting in initial cost estimates that are (a) not 
accurate and (b) biased toward being unrealistically low. More specifically, the TCE 
perspective suggests the traditional WBS approach indeed overlooks two important 
variables: Coordination Costs and Motivation Costs. Unlike the production function 
approach of WBS, the TCE approach focuses on these and other key components of 
major weapon system acquisitions.  
However, once production starts, the contractor acquires specialized information 
and assets. Production is often subject to economies of scale and learning curves. The 
ability to shop around becomes restricted. Even though there may be contestability in 
the original design/development stage, bi-lateral monopoly arrangements emerge.  
The system program office’s functions/activities related to monitoring, controlling, 
information-gathering, reporting, decision reviews, enforcement, etc., grow as 
oversight/governance increases with anticipated scale and risk of investments. Though 
program cost data may exist, it does not tell us the whole story on transaction costs. 
Ideally, we would want to find total program costs and contract costs. The difference 
consists of transaction costs (whose main components are coordination and motivation 
costs). 
Coordination Costs include: i) Search and Information Costs—to identify options 
and acquire timely, accurate and relevant information to evaluate alternatives; ii) 
Bargaining and Decision Costs—to choose an alternative and negotiate and write a 
contract; and iii) Policing and Enforcement Costs—to make payments and measure, 
monitor, and evaluate performance.  
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Motivation Costs include: i) Costs to promote productive effort and incentives to 
encourage investment (better, faster, cheaper) and ii) Costs to deter unproductive 
bargaining, and opportunistic behavior (renegotiation). Factoring TCE cost 
considerations into cost-estimating efforts could help the DoD anticipate cost increases 
in four key areas the GAO suggests help explain cost overruns: 
a) constantly changing missions (uncertain demand/quantity/characteristics, bi-
lateral monopoly, asset specificity, holdup, incomplete contracting);  
b) yearly incremental funding vs. multi-year appropriations (uncertainty, frequency, 
asset specificity, holdup); program instability tends to discourage the investments 
that play a predominant role in moving costs down the learning curve (McNicol, 
2005, p.26).  
c) incentive problems (incomplete contracting, asset specificity, holdup); and  
d) insufficient oversight (measurement, monitoring costs). (GAO, 1997)  
A.  Our Hypotheses in More Detail 
The primary focus of this study is to see if insights from TCE can improve DoD 
cost-estimation/forecasting techniques. Our inquiry can conceptually be divided into 
three questions: 
1. Is cost growth a problem?  
Ho: C = Mean Cost Growth Factor = Actual Cost/Forecast Cost = 1 
H1: C > 1 
2. Can cost-estimating models which include TCE insights improve 
estimated/forecast costs?  
Ho: TCE Factors (Complexity, Uncertainty, Asset Specificity, Frequency, etc.) do 
not matter—not significant in explaining cost growth.  
Ha: Alternatively, Forecast Cost = f (Production Costs; Transaction Costs), 
where Production Costs = g (WBS + systems integration), 
Transaction Costs = Coordination Costs + Motivation Costs, 
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Coordination Costs = g (Market Contestability Structure; Asset Specificity; 
Frequency; Search & Information tasks, Contracting & 
Enforcement functions, needed Management & 
Monitoring) 
Motivation Costs = h (Complexity; Uncertainty [of various kinds], Contract 
Type ...)   
There is a fair amount of evidence about these hypotheses extant. In a sample of 
52 systems, the GAO found that RDT&E costs for programs that started development 
with mature technologies (low complexity/uncertainty) increased by a modest average 
of around 5%, while those with immature technologies (high complexity/uncertainty) 
experience cost growth on average of almost 35%. Similarly, unit costs of procurement 
rose by less than 1% for programs with mature technology, whereas programs that 
started with immature technologies saw increases in unit costs of nearly 27% over initial 
estimates. As predicted by TCE, Complexity and Uncertainty combine to increase 
contractual hazards. If this is not adequately addressed in the contracting phase, then 
there is a greater likelihood of cost overruns.  
B.  The Case for the Null Hypotheses  
Broadly stated, the null hypotheses state that incorporating TCE considerations 
into cost estimates will not significantly improve cost-estimating methodology.  In the 
course of our research, we found a surprisingly persuasive case in favor of that 
proposition.  There are, in fact, a number of reasons to be skeptical about our claim that 
transactions cost factors are important in determining costs of major acquisition 
programs.  A number of plausible assertions (some related, some mutually exclusive) 
underlay such skepticism.  While we find these assertions unpersuasive on balance, we 
cannot dismiss them out of hand. 
1. Asymetric Scope for Opportunistic Behavior in Defense Transactions:  It is more 
difficult to behave opportunistically when involved in a business relationship with 
a sovereign entity.  In that case, the government has more scope for 
opportunistic behavior, with more of the attendant costs falling on the contractors.  
And, since the cost estimates we’re considering refer primarily to the 
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government’s cost, adding TCE considerations considers only minor factors in 
those costs. 
2. Constancy of TCE factors: Transactions costs are pretty much constant for all 
major acquisition programs. 
a. If (as asserted above) the government has more scope for opportunistic 
behavior, then prospective business partners will take that factor into account 
when considering whether to compete for government business—and build 
compensation for those risks into their bids.  Furthermore, such risk premiums 
may be fairly constant across various types of projects, such as major 
acquisition programs. 
b. Every program includes an allowance for managing the contractual 
relationship (even though it’s difficult to assign program management 
overhead completely to individual programs.)  Possibly every program has 
enough of a management allowance to manage the program reasonably well.  
Put another way, the rule-of-thumb standard for program management 
permits individual program managers to deal with transactions difficulties well 
into the range of diminishing returns.  Thus, even though transactions costs 
vary among programs, the standard program management allocation is 
sufficient to obscure those differences. 
c. Continuing with this line of reasoning, a variant of Parkinson’s Law might 
apply.  That is, for some programs the standard budget for program 
management is too much.  However, program managers—perceiving 
(probably accurately) that more program management activity has some 
marginal return -- are strongly inclined to spend all their management 
budgets. 
3. Transactions Cost factors are already accounted for in current cost-estimation 
methods.  Measures of risk and complexity (such as technical-readiness 
indicators) indeed indicate the risk and complexity of the project.  Also, however, 
the presence of those factors also offers increased scope for opportunistic 
behavior, and with it an increase in transactions cost.  That is, the transactions 
cost elements in major program costs are highly correlated with variables already 
considered in standard cost-estimating methods. 
4. It all evens out.  Scope for opportunistic behavior cuts both ways.  Scope for 
government opportunism increases (decreases) contractors’ (government) costs 
while contractor opportunism increases (decreases) government (contractors’) 
costs.  On average, it might well balance out. 
5. While the effects of TCE considerations are important and a very significant 
factor in program costs, they’re very hard to find (and quantify).  By definition, 
opportunistic behavior involves guile (Williamson, 1996), and those who behave 
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opportunistically have already taken pains to conceal their behavior (or assign 
other motives to it). 
Therefore, while there is a persuasive case of the importance of TCE 
considerations in defense acquisition processes, it’s not clear that one would be 
immediately led to conclude that incorporating TCE principles into cost-estimating 
models either (a) improves their explanatory power or (b) ameliorates the low-ball 
biases we observe in current practice.  It comes down to a matter of resolving 
competing hypotheses with empirical data.   
C.  Testing Our Hypotheses 
As shown in the sections above, our research has uncovered reasons to believe 
that TCE factors are important in DoD acquisition costs, but also that TCE insights may, 
in fact, not improve cost-estimation methodology.  What’s left is to sort out the 
competing claims using the available empirical evidence.   
Our hypothesized set of relationships is depicted in Figure 3 below.  To reject our 
null hypothesis, we need to do empirical tests, and have accordingly sought data on 
major DoD acquisition programs.  For Indicators of High Transactions Costs, we apply 
the Powell (2002) stoplight scheme, with special emphasis on asset specificity.  For 
observable manifestations of cost problems and governance issues during the program, 
we can consult histories of actual programs.  In this report, we use case studies of 
actual Army acquisition programs compiled by one of our team members (John Dillard).  
These are reported in Section VII. 



















Figure 3.  TCE Issues in Acquisition Projects and Hypothesized Cost 
Manifestations 
We’ve also tracked Program Management Office costs as an indicator of actual 
transactions costs present within any given program.  These are reported in Section 
VIII. 
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VII. TCE Applied to Two Defense Acquisition Case 
Studies  
In the some of these authors’ previous work (Dillard, Franck and Melese, 2006), 
fundamentals of transaction cost economics (TCE) were explained and insights from it 
were applied to defense acquisition. TCE asserts that “make-or-buy” decisions for the 
needs of a firm ultimately define its own vertical boundaries. And though much of the 
body of knowledge thus far consists of studies from the private sector, many public 
concerns engage in outsourcing as well. Defense acquisition is one such very large 
public enterprise and extends from R&D and procurement of materiel to purchasing 
services and sustaining support for its military forces. It is unique because, for the most 
part, the Department of Defense outsources much of what we consider to be 
“acquisition,” commissioning external suppliers to develop products for its internal use, 
unlike many private and public organizations that conduct internal product development 
for themselves and others (or external products/services for others).  TCE 
acknowledges that outsourcing relationships can vary widely in their transactional 
characteristics and can involve extra transaction costs such as measurement, 
monitoring, and negotiation costs that could negate the initially perceived advantages of 
the buy-versus-make decision. 
TCE is descriptive of economic behavior and recognizes the issue of motivation. 
It assumes that economic actors, such as government acquiring “principals” and 
defense industry supplying “agents,” are motivated to forecast potential outcomes and 
factor these into contracts. The DoD’s general motivation (among, no doubt, other 
agendas) in its acquisition transactions is the seeking of better products, delivered 
quickly, and with fewest resources (i.e., performance, schedule, and cost). But such 
outsourcing is complicated by other phenomena. TCE characteristics of complexity 
(such as technology) and uncertainty (such as duration of work) apply clearly to many 
Defense acquisition transactions and lead to “incomplete contracting,” termed as such 
from imperfect information and our inability to predict the future.  These endanger a 
firm’s ability to protect its own interest throughout the transaction, but hopefully are 
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mitigated via governance mechanisms that positively influence a supplier’s motivation to 
comply with the terms of an incomplete contract.  These might be via contract 
incentives, enforcement mechanisms, monitoring methods, etc. 
Another often encountered but heretofore largely unrecognized TCE 
characteristic (at least in Defense acquisition literature) is that of asset specificity—a 
situation in which a supplier “locks-in” the government by making investments in 
productive assets that are specific to the transaction and have little value elsewhere. 
Asset specificity can be related to physical capital equipment, human skills, facility 
location, and even brand equity (reputation). While needed to accomplish the work at 
hand, the result of these investments form barriers to competitive entry and can also 
result in a “holdup.” A holdup is a problem that occurs when, for example, the agent in a 
contract has a specific asset with concerns that, after its investment, may have to 
accept worse terms than anticipated. Conversely, the principal has become increasingly 
dependent on the agent during his investment in the specific assets. It has become 
fairly typical in the DoD acquisition experience: with development contracts that are 
necessarily incomplete, sometimes won by low bids, and changes in contract scope 
later arise. The contractor can anticipate higher returns from “holding up” the 
government for such contract modifications. And while the government might have the 
sovereign right to terminate the contract for convenience, it will still be left with the 
demand for the product or service that was sought. Such has been the case in several 
programs observed by these authors, along with excursions into contract type and 
structure as options for obtaining desired outcomes.  
A.  Acquisition Case Examples 
One of the authors was fortunate to have served as the Assistant Project 
Manager for Research & Development in two separate major defense acquisition 
programs that were offspring of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) initiatives. These programs are described below to illustrate TCE challenges 
and uses of governance mechanisms. 
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The Javelin Project 
The Advanced Anti-Armor Weapon System—Medium (AAWS-M), later to 
become the Javelin, began in 1982 as the DARPA program “Tank Breaker.”14  This was 
a one-year technology demonstration to explore various missile-guidance solutions for a 
medium range (i.e., 1-2000 meters) man-portable, anti-tank weapon. It was spawned as 
a result of deficiencies that were immediately apparent in the recently fielded DRAGON 
weapon system, which had replaced the M67 90mm recoilless rifle in the late 1970s.  
The DRAGON was a wire-guided, line-of-sight missile that was developed in response 
to the 1960s appearance of the Soviet AT-3 SAGGER, a manpack missile carried in a 
fiberglass "suitcase." In 1978, a Mission Need Statement highlighted deficiencies of the 
DRAGON, such as its poor reliability, limited range/lethality, and the difficulty for 
gunners to aim and track targets. The envisioned replacement was to satisfy a 
substantial increase in requirements—namely: range, lethality, reduced weight, and the 
ability to launch from enclosures (such as buildings or field-fortified bunkers). Several 
years were spent finalizing these requirements until the joint Army and Marine Corps 
operational requirements document was formally approved in 1986-88. A competitive 
fly-off program, which would now be called the “Technology Development phase,” was 
conducted in 1987-1989 to select from three teams of contractors and critical 
technologies: a laser-beam rider led by Ford Aerospace, a fiber-optic guidance effort led 
by Hughes, and a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) thermal imaging sensor effort from 
Texas Instruments and Martin-Marietta. Clearly, the down-selection to one team was of 
great incentive to the participants, for it meant the likely follow-on award of the 
advanced development phase as well as production opportunities.  Cost Plus Fixed Fee 
(CPFF) contracts were used with each of the three teams. Such is typical for “proof-of-
principle” type R&D efforts in which knowledge work is risky for the contractor, and there 
are few discrete parameters to incentivize. All three teams were successful in flying 
missiles to their targets, but the only technology that enabled a true fire-and-forget 
capability (which was not a specified requirement) was the FLIR approach. Though this 
                                            
14 DTIC reports summarizing this DARPA effort are available at 
http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA122234. 
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approach was recognized to be the most technically immature and risky, the desire for 
fire-and-forget survivability resulted in the FLIR team being awarded a contract for a 
three-year advanced-development phase.   
In June of 1989, a full-scale development (now called System Development and 
Demonstration) contract was awarded for the Javelin program. The program was 
structured to encourage competition and give incentives for the accomplishment of all of 
the system objectives of the Department of Defense. First of all, the contract would be 
awarded to a team of two partnering firms that would combine their efforts for 
development of the system and split apart to compete during the production phase. The 
initial low-rate production was envisioned to be a competitive split awarded annually 
with a fifty/fifty or sixty/forty split between partners, via the use of fixed-price contracts. 
Such contracts are also typical for production efforts in which the design (uncertainty 
and complexity) is presumed to have evolved to a point of stability. At the macro level, 
the office of the Secretary of Defense viewed the program as acceptable with regard to 
risk because of its 27-month technology development phase and subsequent 36-month 
plan for full-scale development.  
During the technology-development phase, all three contractor teams had scored 
over 62% hits with at least ten missile shots each in a variety of environments and 
operational settings. The full-scale development contract request for proposal was 
written for a cost-plus-incentive-fee type of contract, but the winning proposal was 
presented with a “no-fee” bid. This surprised the Government, which nevertheless 
awarded a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, giving incentives for key performance 
parameters such as weight and warhead performance that it considered technically 
risky. The total value of the contract was $169.7 million, the amount bid by the winning 
team of Texas Instruments and Martin-Marietta. Meanwhile, the Government privately 
conducted its own should-cost estimate and budgeted $263 million for the 36-month 
long development effort. In addition, the Government ran its own alternate warhead 
technology development program with CMS acting as the contractor.  
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The two-partner Joint Venture in full-scale development was also free to 
maximize competition at the subcontractor level. In their make-versus-buy decision, 
Texas Instruments elected to make the focal plane array for both of its uses in the 
command launch unit and in the missile. They had made these devices for other 
programs but not in these two distinct configurations. Their physical-specific assets 
were located at the manufacturing facility in Lewisville, Texas, largely for the promise of 
the Javelin system’s later production. They had expanded that facility for the Javelin 
program in anticipation of producing some 58,000 to 70,000 missiles and 5,000 
command launch units (the thermal imaging sighting device).  
Each missile focal plane array was forecasted to be approximately 15% of the 
missile's cost (or about $12,000 for each of the focal plane arrays) based upon a 
$90,000 “cost per kill” program objective. Focal plane array technology was still 
immature and would be gauged today at approximately technology readiness level five 
(on a 1-9 scale), despite its successful technology development phase results. It was 
always recognized as technologically risky, so the Government partially funded other 
companies that could produce these devices. In 1991, the only five known FPA makers 
in the world were Rockwell International, Loral, Santa Barbara Research Corporation, 
Sofradir (a French firm), and Texas Instruments.  
As an additional gauge of technological maturity, a baseline test was mandated 
at the second milestone upon the decision to launch the Javelin program into full-scale 
development. That test would pit the immature focal plane array technology against 
existing TOW and DRAGON (legacy systems) missile optics. Results of this test 
showed the Javelin's immature focal plane arrays to be substantially better in 
performance than the DRAGON and almost as good or as good as the larger TOW anti-
tank missile system.  
Approximately 18 months after the full-scale development phase contract award, 
the Javelin project manager called for a Defense Acquisition Board, forecasting a Nunn-
McCurdy breach of cost and scheduling thresholds in this ACAT 1-D program. Several 
reasons were cited, not the least of which was that the focal plane array production yield 
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was not as predicted—and all of the devices were below specification. The cost growth 
was found throughout the various elements of the project, as illustrated in Table 2 
below. 
Over the next year, the program was given a new baseline with many different 
revised program estimates climbing from 36 months duration and $298 million in cost, to 
48 months duration and $372 million in cost, and then to 54 months and $420 million for 
the total cost and duration of this phase. In addition to the rebaselining, the Government 
renegotiated its cost-plus-incentive-fee contract with the joint venture and established 
cost sharing for any expenditure above $372 million, all the way to the contract ceiling of 
$420 million.  
This was a very unique move, to re-establish governance mechanisms in the 
middle of a transaction.  But the contractor’s “failure to perform,” although in an 
uncertain R&D environment, justified the new relationship. At 30 months after contract 
award, the program was finally formally re-baselined to be 54 months and $443 million, 
with 50/50 JV and Government cost-sharing ratio above that amount. 
In October of 1991 at a meeting in the Lewisville, Texas, focal plane array 
manufacturing facility, the “divorce” finally came for TI as prime vendor of the missile 
focal plane array. Texas Instruments had failed to achieve specification for the item by 
the target date, but they still had a stake in the program as one of the principal players 
on the joint venture team.  
About this same time, the Government discovered a focal plane array “holding 
account” that had been proposed and was awarded in scope of the contract. 
Essentially, this holding account accrued charges to the Government for every non-
specification compliant focal plane array that TI had produced. The cumulative total was 
to be billed all at once, when they achieved the first specification-compliant focal plane 
array.  
 - 37 - 
Table 2. Early 1991 Summary of Javelin Program Component Cost Growth 
Since the contract was cost-reimbursable in form, the Government was likely to 
have to pay for all costs of development regardless of spec compliance, but the way the 
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billing transpired took the Government by surprise.  Fortunately, dual sourcing of critical 
components is a fundamental element in acquisition strategy development and risk 
mitigation. And the selection of Hughes’ Santa Barbara Research Corporation as a sub-
contractor to the other Joint Venture partner, Martin-Marietta, saved the Javelin 
program. That small company had discovered a process for serial production of near-
perfect focal plane arrays, and they were accelerated to provide these for the program. 
The investment was, in hindsight, a “real option” that was exercised mid-project with 
great return on investment. 
Within that year, the program was restructured, given the new baseline, and 
finished largely within its new parameters. The additional 18 months added to the 36-
month phase helped resolve the uncertainties and complexities of system development 
without additional schedule slippage. Later, production quantities were slashed in half 
as the Defense Department drew down its forces from 1991-2000, and the acquisition 
strategy to split apart the joint venture and compete them in production was not fulfilled. 
Benefits of a split production no longer able to be realized, the JV remained intact as the 
producing entity. Today Javelin is seen as a successful weapon system, is being used 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and has been through several full-rate production contract 
periods.  
The Army Tactical Missile System Project 
The Army Tactical Missile System also started out as a DARPA program, called 
Assault Breaker, in the 1970s. The system's prime contractor for the vehicle, the 
Multiple Launch Rocket System, or MLRS, was LTV Corporation. With significant asset 
specificity from their platform efforts (and physical & knowledge capital), they bid upon 
and won two separate contracts for the Army Tactical Missile System. These were both 
firm-fixed-price: one for the invention of the missile and one for its integration into the 
platform. The program was a 48-month full-scale development effort that was begun in 
1986 and ended in 1990.  In stark contrast to the Javelin program, fixed-price contracts 
were deemed appropriate to this transaction because of the technology maturity in the 
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ATACMS project, relative to most others, where CPIF contracts are common—as 
depicted in Table 3. 
Table 3. Comparison of Programs Using Different Contract Types and 
Technology Readiness Levels 
Also, this program was structured to have production options, should the full-
scale development phase be successful. Thus, there were incentives for “performance” 
on both the Government and the contractor side: LTV was given an incentive to 
succeed in the development of the missile and its integration in order to win the follow-
on low- and full-rate production contracts. And likewise, the Government had an 
“incentive” to conduct reviews and make decisions to award production by November of 
1990. This was to preserve production-pricing options that the contractor had been 
asked to provide in his proposal for advanced development. The price reduction from 
these options, if exercised before expiration, was on the order of 40%. As it turned out, 
the production options were exercised within a week of their expiration, saving the 
Government several hundred thousand dollars per missile on the eve of the first Persian 
Gulf War.  
These cases may only serve to illustrate several recognized economic behaviors 
within the context of large acquisition transactions. As an adjunct to our earlier work 
 - 40 - 
(Dillard, Franck & Melese, 2006), they show how complexity and uncertainty of 
development projects relate to contract type and governance mechanisms. Importantly, 
they also convey the need to constrain scope in order to control cost and schedule. In 
and of themselves, they cannot necessarily prove cause and effect, but rather reveal 
the importance of understanding key characteristics of a transaction early in the cost-
estimation process in order to capture relevant transaction cost elements that can 
impact the ultimate price paid for major weapon systems. 
B.  TCE Assessment of the Case Studies 
As indicated in Section VI above, we looked for observable effects of TCE factors 
in actual DoD acquisition programs.  This section analyzes the two cases (Javelin and 
ATACMS) described above in terms of: (1) ex ante indicators of transactions costs, (2) 
manifestations of motivation and coordination problems in the course of the program, 
and (3) cost overruns observable at program completion. 
The ex ante indicators come from a scheme proposed by Powell (2002) and 
augmented by Franck (2004).  The indicators of transaction costs considered here are 
asset specificity, complexity, length of the relationship (or transaction), time sensitivity of 
performance, and operational significance of performance.  (These are shown in Table 
4 on the following page.)
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TCE Indicator Assessment Comments 
Asset Specificity YELLOW TI’s insourcing of FPA production.  
Mitigated by planned dual-source 
production, and steps to diversify FPA 
sources. 
Complexity RED Fire-and-forget feature added  
significantly to complexity. 
Length of 
Relationship 
YELLOW Technical immaturity necessitated a 
lengthy development program. 
Time Sensitivity YELLOW Green after end of Cold War. 
Operational 
Significance 
YELLOW Green after end of Cold War  
Table 4.  Ex Ante Assessment of Javelin Development Program 
TCE Indicator Assessment Comments 
Asset Specificity RED Pre-existing condition.  
Contractor’s previous experience 
with launch vehicle.  Production 
option proved a hedge for the 
contractor. 
Complexity GREEN Technology generally mature 
Length of 
Relationship 
GREEN Advanced Development Phase 
only. 
Time Sensitivity YELLOW Green after end of Cold War 
Operational 
Significance 
YELLOW Green after end of Cold War 
Table 5. Ex Ante Assessment of ATACMS Development Program 
(Powell (2002), Franck (2004) and authors’ assessments) 
The relative immaturity of Javelin technologies necessitated a long and complex 
transaction.  Worth noting is that a government decision, in favor of the fire-and-forget 
feature, increased these difficulties.15  By contrast, the ATACMS development program 
was based largely on proven technologies.  For both development programs, Time 
                                            
15 We have no basis to question (from an ex ante perspective) the Army’s decision to opt for a less 
mature technology in pursuit of significantly higher performance.  However, we believe consideration of 
the increase in scope for opportunistic behavior in the program should be considered when making such 
decisions. 
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Sensitivity and Operational Significance decreased considerably with the end of the 
Cold War.  Both ATACMS and Javelin were designed to counter massive Warsaw Pact 
mechanized offensives, at the operational and tactical levels respectively.  With the end 
of the Cold War, both priority (operational significance) and urgency (time sensitivity) 
lessened accordingly.  Arguably, this development significantly strengthened the 
government’s position in the negotiations associated with governance of both programs. 
Observable manifestations of motivation and coordination difficulties during the 
course of the project are gleaned from the narratives above.  For Javelin, there were a 
number of difficulties apparent throughout the problem, predictable from a TCE 
perspective.  These included the following. 
 The winning bid clearly seems to have been a buy-in.  The contracting team’s 
initial estimate was significantly below the government’s estimate of most likely 
program cost.  From a TCE perspective, this can be interpreted as setting the 
stage for opportunistic behavior on behalf of the contractors. 
 One member (Texas Instruments) of the development team (the Joint Venture) 
chose to make the Focal Plane Arrays (FPAs) within firm boundaries.  The FPAs 
were arguably the critical, and pacing, element of the Javelin development 
program.  Whether this indicates opportunistic behavior by TI, or simply a 
miscalculation, is difficult to assess.  Worth noting, however, is that the Army took 
steps toward developing an alternate source.  A TCE perspective would indicate 
the government perceived some scope for opportunistic behavior; a risk-
management perspective would interpret this as a risk reduction measure.  
 There was steady, and cumulatively very significant, cost growth throughout the 
program.  As a result, the Program Manager reported breaches of criteria for 
both cost and schedule—relatively early during the program.   
 Other cost-growth problems appeared.  For example, the bill for FPA’s not 
meeting specifications was presented to the government without previous notice.  
This turned out to be an unpleasant surprise.  Whether this was simply a 
communications difficulty or opportunistic behavior on the part of the Joint 
Venture is not clear. 
 Consequently, governance of the transaction became significantly more 
complicated.  Major changes to program structure were negotiated as part of a 
“re-baselining.”  Additionally, the contract’s incentive structure was changed— 
from a cost-plus to a risk-sharing form. 
Overall, there was significant cost growth (over 150%) in the Javelin 
development program. 
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For ATACMS, the only major indicator of transactions cost-related difficulties was 
asset specificity.  LTV’s previous experience with the launch vehicle (the MLRS) gave it 
a substantial advantage over alternate vendors—making this an excellent example of 
what can happen with asset specificity.  However, the program was executed on 
schedule and within the original cost estimate.  It’s possible that LTV had no incentive to 
low-ball its original estimate with its already significant advantages over potential 
competitors based on asset specificity.   
There was arguably evidence of opportunistic behavior on the part of the 
government.   
 A program based on a fixed-price contract was extended by three months (from 
48 to 51) simply because of governmental convenience—without compensation 
to the contractor.   
 Also, the government was slow to exercise its option to order the start of 
production, and would likely have delayed its decision further were it not for the 
imminent expiration of a favorable price option in the contract.  It’s reasonable to 
suppose that this part of the contract served to head off opportunistic behavior on 
the part of the government. 
Some observations are useful at this point.  First, the indicators of high 
transactions costs should be considered in toto.  As we’ve stated above, there are 
excellent reasons to believe that asset specificity is particularly important in creating 
conditions for opportunistic behavior in a transaction.  However, in the case of 
ATACMS, there appears to have been no bad behavior that added significantly to 
program outcomes (cost, schedule or performance), despite the RED assessment for 
asset specificity. 
Second, opportunistic behavior in transactions is a question of motives, and it’s 
difficult to sort out motives in case narratives.  For example, was the contractors’ 
original estimate for Javelin development a buy-in or a manifestation of the Winner’s 
Curse?  Was the unexpected presentation of the bill for substandard Javelin FPAs a 
matter of opportunistic behavior (self-interest seeking with guile) or simply an 
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administrative failure to communicate?  Without considerably more information than 
what is available in the public record, it’s difficult to sort out such matters.16 
However, finally, there is good evidence that TCE perspectives offer significant 
explanatory power in analyzing program outcomes—including cost.  Based on this 
sample of two, however, it’s explanation of the qualitative sort.  Our next section (VIII) 
explores quantitative evidence of transactions costs at a macro level. 
                                            
16 The obvious incentives to conceal the motives underlying self-seeking behavior add to this difficulty. 
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VIII. Program Office Costs and TCE 
In order to test our hypothesis that the traditional WBS approach may overlook 
some important variables resulting in unrealistically low initial cost estimates, we would 
have to compare cost estimates for systems that included significant transaction costs 
with those of systems that did not include significant transaction costs.  The first 
problem, then, was to find a way to measure transaction costs in acquisition programs.  
We proposed using Program Management Office (PMO) costs as a proxy measure of 
the amount of transaction costs present in an acquisition program. 
We started by examining information from the Consolidated Acquisition 
Reporting System (CARS) to find evidence of transaction costs.  The information is 
contained in the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Business Information Laboratory 
(BIL) database managed by OUSD(AT&L) Acquisition Resources and Analysis.  It 
includes information on contract performance and program cost from a variety of 
reports, such as Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) and Defense Acquisition Executive 
Summaries (DAES), as well as other reports.  Unfortunately, these reports do not 
contain the level of detail necessary to identify transaction costs.  Specifically, there was 
no information on the amount of resources estimated or used for the PMO. 
Instead, we looked at the Budget Item Justification sheets in the OSD budget 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/budgetindex.html).  While there is some 
information on PMO costs in these documents, it is reported inconsistently or not at all 
(depending on the program and year).  For example, the Marine Corps Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)17 reported Program Office costs in exhibit R-3 
under “Support and Management Organizations” for FY97 and FY98, but discontinued 
reporting that line-item in subsequent years.  Note also that what is included in PMO 
costs is not a complete picture of the resources used, since military salaries are 
                                            
17 The name of this program changed to Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) in FY03. 
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excluded and civilian salaries may or may not be included depending on how they are 
funded. 
The AAAV reported costs for the more general category “Support and 
Management” for FY97 – FY06, but the line-items included in this category varied from 
year to year.  If we expand our proxy measure to the “Support and Management” 
category, we are including, in addition to Program Office costs, other support contracts, 
miscellaneous contracts and government labs, as well as modeling and simulation.  As 
the program developed, this category grew to include integrated logistics support, 
training devices and simulators, tech data and publications development and support 
equipment development.  Clearly, this category includes costs that should not be 
considered transaction costs, such as training devices and simulators and tech data and 
publications.  More importantly, what is and is not included in the category varies over 
time, making the identification of transaction costs difficult on a case-by-case basis and 
nearly impossible on a large scale. 
A more significant problem we encountered is that the information reported in 
CARS does not necessarily track to the information reported for the same program in 
the OSD budget.  This problem was confirmed by OUSD(AT&L) Acquisition Resources 
and Analysis and is an issue they have been working on for over 3 years and have 
documented in a Comparison Report that identifies potential FY07 funding disconnects 
between the OUSD(Comptroller) Budget Justification Materials and the OUSD(AT&L) 
Draft Selected Acquisition Reports.   
Contributing to the difficulty of identifying program transaction costs is the fact 
that program managers only report information on a program's major contracts for 
RDT&E, procurement, military construction, and acquisition-related operation and 
maintenance.  According to the CARS Users’ Guide, SAR Section 15 (Contract 
Information) only includes the six largest, currently active contracts (excludes 
subcontracts) that exceed $40 million in then-year dollars.  For a given reporting 
quarter, these are generally the same contracts reporting in Section 6 (Program 
Background Data) of the DAES.  If a previously reported contract is over 90% complete, 
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it will no longer be reported.  So, tracking Budget at Completion (BAC) and Estimate at 
Completion (EAC) at the program level involves moving targets as the individual 
contracts are completed and drop out of the CARS.  Also, the total amount shown for 
the program in the OSD budget may include other contracts not reported in CARS. 
Due to the data difficulties described above, we were unable to test our first 
hypothesis using our selected proxy measure for transaction costs.  In fact, it seems 
measuring transaction costs directly or by proxy from the existing data bases may not 
be possible.   
As an alternative, we could always infer that differences due to complexity or 
technology maturity imply higher transaction costs and use this categorization to 
compare programs with assumed high transaction costs to programs with assumed low 
transaction costs.  For example, Brown, Flowe and Hamel define transaction costs as 
costs associated with interdependent activities, and they suggest that joint programs 
(involving two or more services) would have higher transaction costs than single-service 
programs.  Certainly, the coordination costs could be assumed to be higher for joint 
programs.  When they examined 84 DoD weapon system programs (45 joint and 39 
single) in terms of number and type of programmatic breaches, they found that joint 
programs were statistically more likely to experience breaches in schedule, research 
development testing and evaluation costs and unit costs.  If we assume joint programs 
have higher transactions costs, then their findings may suggest that programs with 
higher transactions costs require distinct measures and metrics to improve cost and 
schedule estimates. 
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IX. Summary and Policy Recommendations  
Developing accurate cost forecasts is essential for future budgeting and to 
improving defense decision-making. This paper has documented a growing body of 
evidence of a systematic downward bias in initial cost estimates for major weapon 
systems. An important consequence of these forecasting difficulties is that “major 
weapon systems […] are experiencing recurring problems with cost overruns, missed 
deadlines, and performance shortfalls”  (GAO, 2006, March, p.1). Runaway costs 
threaten to weaken the armed forces. Cash-flow shortfalls lead to quantity reductions, 
reprogramming, and funding reductions for other programs. These cost increases mean 
that the DoD cannot produce as many weapons as intended nor deliver those weapons 
to the warfighter when promised. Cost overruns squeeze existing and competing 
programs. Higher price tags mean that fewer of those weapons end up in the hands of 
soldiers, and that options on new weapons cannot be exercised without breaking the 
budget.  
Two factors are usually blamed for unrealistically low cost forecasts: bad 
incentives (psychological and political-economic explanations) and bad estimates 
(methodological explanations). The focus of this paper is on cost methodology. The 
case studies suggest that inclusion of transaction costs as a recognized component of 
total cost adds to explanatory and forecasting power of cost-estimation methods.  
However, we also found that current data bases are not well structured for identifying 
the transaction costs of major acquisition programs—for a number of reasons. 
What can be done to reduce actual costs/expenditures?  TCE suggests 
identifying strategies to cut coordination and motivation costs. Specific 
recommendations to cut Coordination and Motivation Costs would include the following: 
a. Reducing Complexity: Investing in a more complete contract (increasing search 
and information costs) and the use of more mature technologies. 
b. Reducing Uncertainty through multi-year contracts (demand uncertainty); 
investing in more complete contracts (relationship uncertainty).  
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c. Increasing measurement and monitoring to reduce information asymmetries (and 
associated risks).  
d. Putting credible deterrents to bad behavior in place—such as penalty clauses, 
warranties and bonding; using multi-year contracts to gather information and 
reward good reputations.  
e. Mitigating the uncertainties introduced by asset specificity through careful use of 
incentives, proper bundling of goods and services and GOCO assets. 
f. Increasing contestability of government contracts through government-controlled 
standby capacity (threat of vertical integration), second sourcing, and 
preservation of real options (threat of entry of competing suppliers).  
That said, however, the primary insight drawn from TCE is that correctly 
estimating production costs is necessary, but not sufficient. The choice of contract, 
organization, and incentives—along with key characteristics of markets and transactions 
(uncertainty, complexity, asset specificity, frequency, and contestability)—must be 
included to obtain reliable cost estimates. Leveraging TCE in this way could help 
characterize, explain, forecast, and ultimately reduce the cost growth that plagues many 
of today’s major investments in military capabilities. 
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